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Sammis: Community Property

Community Property
and Family Law
by Arthur M. Sammis*
Important developments in community property and family
law in California in 1967 were largely the result of legislative
enactment, although several important decisions were rendered by the appellate courts of California. Those cases and
statutory revisions making significant changes in the law will
be discussed here under appropriate headings.
Orders for Support--Modification and Enforcement.
In the past ten years, there have been more changes in
the law governing payments for support and maintenance
than in any other area of family law. Commencing in 1959,
the legislature failed in only one general session, that of 1965,
to enact amendments to Civil Code section 139. The statutory amendments have attempted to deal with the difficulties
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arising out of integrated agreements covering both property
and support rights, where the provisions relating to the division of property and those relating to support constitute reciprocal consideration. l
Prior to 1959 in Plumer v. Superior Court 2 and Puckett v.
Puckett, 3 provisions in agreements for child support were held
subject to modification by way of increase only; the power to
make a downward revision was denied. This limitation was
removed by the 1959 amendment4 to Civil Code section 139,
which expressly was made nonretroactive. Agreements providing for child support entered into after September 18, 1959,
the effective date of the amendment, may be increased or
decreased upon a proper showing. Although some doubt has
been expressed,5 they would clearly seem to be enforceable
by contempt. 6
A more complicated problem is presented in cases involving
support provisions for one of the spouses rather than for
children. In 1957, the California Supreme Court in Bradley
v. Superior Courf held that such provisions contained in an
integrated property settlement, although merged in an interlocutory or final decree of divorce, were unenforceable by
contempt. As stated by the court,
1. On the other hand, no problems
arise where orders for support and
maintenance are contained in decrees
for divorce or separate maintenance,
where such orders are not based upon
agreement of the parties or, if made
pursuant to such agreement, are predicated on independent covenants. Such
orders are modifiable, except as to accrued amounts, and are enforceable by
contempt. See Cal. Civ. Code § 139.
2. 50 Cal.2d 631, 328 P.2d 193
(1958).
3. 21 Ca1.2d 833, 136 P.2d 1 (1943).
4. Stats. 1959, ch. 1399, § 1, p. 3678.
5. Report of State Bar Committee on
1963 Conference Resolutions Nos. 22,
40 and 61, July 30, 1964. See Synop114
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sis of Testimony Presented to the Assembly Interim Committee on Judiciary,
September 30, 1964, in Santa Monica,
California, at 20.
6. The conclusion that despite the
modifiability of post-1959 child-support
provisions, the courts will deny contempt on the basis of the contractual
origin, is refuted by the reasoning of
the court in Heller v. Heller, 230 Cal.
App.2d 679, 41 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1964),
upholding enforcement by contempt of
modifiable spouse-support provisions in
integrated agreements subject to the
1961-1963 law under Civil Code section 139.
7. 48 Cal.2d 509, 310 P.2d 634
(1957).
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[P]ayments provided in a property settlement agreement which are found to constitute an adjustment of
property interests, rather than a severable provision for
alimony, should be held to fall within the constitutional
proscription against imprisonment for debt. That is, if
the obligation sought to be enforced is contractual and
negotiated, as distinguished from marital and imposed
by law, even though the contract relates to marriage
obligations, the remedy must be appropriate to the right
asserted. s
And in the absence of agreement by the parties, or express
statutory authority, such provisions are also nonmodifiable.
In 1961 further amendments to Civil Code section l39
extended the power to modify or revoke to an order for support of the other party based upon a provision for such support
in an integrated property settlement agreement,9 but limited
this power to cases involving minor children of the parties.
The 1961 amendments were repealed in 1963,10 and the
repeal expressly was made nonretroactive. Integrated agreements executed between the effective date of the 1961 amendment, September 15, and the effective date of the 1963
amendment, September 20, are therefore governed by the
1961 legislation and are modifiable and enforceable by contempt. l l Integrated agreements executed subsequent thereto
and prior to November 8, 1967 are governed by the earlier
law, are nonmodifiable, and fall within the proscription of
Bradley.
The 1967 amendments to Civil Code section 139 are
sweeping. To the extent that they deal with provisions for
child support, they simply clarify and restate existing law.
To the extent that they deal with modification and enforcement
of provisions for the support and maintenance of either spouse,
they purport to be a direct answer to Bradley. The section, as
amended, states that the provisions of any agreement for the
support of either party shall be deemed separate and severable
8. 48 Cal.2d at 522, 310 P.2d at 642.
9. Stats. 1961, ch. 2098, § 1, p. 4362.

11. Heller v. Heller, 230 Cal. App.
2d 679, 41 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1964).

10. Stats. 1963, ch. 861, § 1, p. 2097.
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from the provisions relating to property. It further provides
that all orders for support based on such agreements shall
be deemed law-imposed and made under the power of the
court to make such orders. Such support provisions shall be
subject to subsequent modification or revocation by court
order, except as to accrued amounts, and "except to the extent
that any written agreement, or if there is no written agreement,
any oral agreement entered into in open court between the
parties, specifically provides to the contrary" ( emphasis
added) . The amendment also provides that even where there
has been an agreement, support orders may now be enforced
by contempt, notwithstanding any agreements to the contrary.
It has been stated that "amended Section 139 encompasses
the finality advantage of the integrated property settlement
agreement while providing the wife and child the contempt
remedy in case of non-payment as well as the availability
of new court support orders if the integrated agreement is
discharged in bankruptcy.,,12 The last portion of this statement is clearly correct; the new Civil Code section 139.1
expressly grants the power to make appropriate orders for
support and maintenance where such obligation has been discharged in bankruptcy. However, at least some doubt exists
whether the parties may have their cake and eat it too. Undoubtedly the California Legislature so intended, and it would
seem clear that, to the extent that the support provisions are
"severable," "law imposed" and "modifiable," the contractual
and negotiated aspect to which the court referred in Bradley no
longer exists. But the parties may contract against modification and by their agreement limit the authority of the court
in this respect. We may well ask whether an order for support made pursuant to an agreement of the parties, and by
their agreement not subject to later modification, is truly
"law imposed" and "made under the power of the court to
make such orders."
The new legislation is, with minor variations, that discussed
by the State Bar Committee in 1964 and referred to interim
12.

C.E.B. REVIEW OF SELECTED

CODE LEGISLATION
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at 20 (1967).
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committee of the Legislature for study in 1965. In its report,
the State Bar Committee suggested that possibly a constitutional amendment to article I, section 15 of the California
Constitution, which forbids imprisonment for debt, might be
necessary to meet the Bradley problem, but advised that legislation be tried first. The legislation has now been enacted,
and is expressly limited to agreements entered into after the
effective date of the amendments. Some time will elapse,
therefore, before its constitutionality may be tested. When
that time comes, it may be of interest to counsel that Justice
Schaur, who wrote the majority opinion in Bradley, and
Justice Spence, who wrote the majority opinion in Plumer,
are no longer on the bench, while Justice Traynor, who wrote
strong dissents in both cases, is now Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of California.
One additional 1967 amendment to Civil Code section 139
should be noted. The third paragraph of this section now
provides (except as may be otherwise agreed by the parties)
for modification or revocation, upon petition of one of the
parties, of any "decree or judgment granting any allowance
to the other party upon proof that the wife is living with
another man and holding herself out as his wife, although
not married to such man.
." with like provision concerning the husband living with another woman. The provision was enacted to negate the recent decision in Double v.
Double 13 wherein it was held that such conduct was, in the
absence of a showing of other changed circumstances, insufficient justification for termination of an award of alimony to
the erring former wife. It will be interesting to see whether
the courts will hew to the literal provisions of the statute; an
avowed mistress might still collect alimony from her former
husband!
Child Support
The 1961 amendment to Civil Code section 139,14 which·
broadened the power of the court in a divorce or separate
13. 248 Cal. App.2d 650, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 687 (1967).
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maintenance action from that of merely providing for the
"maintenance" of minor children to that of providing for
"support, maintenance and education", was held in Franklin
Life Insurance v. Kitchens15 to constitute a proper basis for
sustaining that portion of a divorce decree requiring a parent
to carry a life insurance policy for the benefit of minor children.
The divorce decree, in dividing the community property,
awarded a life insurance policy under which the wife was
the beneficiary to the husband upon condition that his minor
children should be named as beneficiaries until they reached
majority. The husband failed to change the policy to accommodate this condition. In an action on his death, the insurance company interpleaded the former wife as the named
beneficiary and the children as claimants. The court, while
finding that the children had no direct interest in the policy,
held that they could enforce the provisions of the divorce
decree against their mother, who was a party to the original
action and bound by the order of the court. This decision
is contrary to McKannay v. McKannal 6 which had held
that the court in a divorce action can only divide community
property between the parties and cannot set up terms and
conditions as to its use, and Miller v. Miller/ 7 in which the
court, in reversing a decree requiring the father to keep life
insurance in effect in favor of a minor child, held that the
authority of the court in a divorce action to order child
support was limited to an allowance of money and did not
include the power to allocate specific property.
While confirming the right of a first wife as a premarital
creditor to levy for alimony and child-support payments due
against the community property of a former husband's second
marriage, the California Supreme Court in Weinberg v. Weinberg18 recognized that an apportionment of such obligations
between separate and community income is appropriate. During his second marriage, the defendant husband used community funds to pay both alimony and child support ordered
15. 249 Cal. App.2d 623, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1967).
16. 68 Cal. App. 701, 230 P. 214
(1924).
118
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17. 52 Cal. App.2d 443, 126 P.2d
357 (1942).
18. 67 Cal.2d 567, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13,
432 P.2d 709 (1967).
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in the decree terminating his first marriage; in the interlocutory decree terminating his second venture in matrimony, the
trial court held that he must reimburse the second community
for the alimony payments but that child support was properly
chargeable against the community estate. In reversing, the
California Supreme Court noted that both are continuing obligations based on both the separate and community income of
the husband. However, the court determined that, although
his earnings from separate property were sufficient to pay the
obligations, an apportionment should be made on the basis
of the total separate and community income (including all
capital increases in his separate investments) during his second marriage. Since both obligations are continuing, and
are based in part on his community income, it would be inequitable to charge the whole of either, or the combined
total, to separate income.
In two cases, the responsibility of a mother to provide
support for her children when the father has difficulty doing
so has been strengthened, and in one of these, Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,19 the mother's obligation
is implied to be equal to that of the father. In that decision,
the court agreed with the Appeals Board that the children of
Jacqueline Louise McDonald were "totally dependent" upon
her, even though they lived with and in the custody of their
father who provided them with the basic necessities of life.
However, the standard of living they enjoyed before their
parents' divorce was maintained only by virtue of Mrs. McDonald's completely voluntary gifts and contributions, "and
by virtue of these circumstances the mother was legally liable
for support of her children . . . ."20 They were therefore
entitled to certain workmen's compensation benefits upon
her industrially caused death. In Levy v. Levi a father
who suffered financial reverses was successful in his petition
for assistance from the mother to help support their child,
even though she did not have physical custody. The father's
19. 245 Cal. App.2d 292, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 816 (1966).
20. 245 Cal. App.2d at 295, 53 Cal.
Rptr. at 822.

1. 245 Cal. App.2d 341, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 790 (1966).
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duty to support is not absolute, but "must depend upon the
urgency of the needs of the child and the relative hardship
to each parent in contributing to such needs.,,2 Mrs. Levy
was required to contribute a substantial portion of her income
to a child she had scarcely seen in years. Do these cases
indicate a lessening of a father's responsibility to his children?
Clearly not; however, if the father is having difficulty in meeting his obligations, it seems likely that courts in the future
will require the mother to assist, before allowing the children's
needs to go unsatisfied.
Paternity: Admissibility of Blood Tests
An additional exception to the conclusive presumption of
legitimacy set forth in section 621 of the Evidence Code
appears to be the result of a recent decision of the California
Supreme Court, Jackson v. Jackson. 3 That section, which
restates without substantive change former section 1962.5
of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides: "Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the issue of a wife cohabiting with
her husband, who is not impotent, is conclusively presumed
to be legitimate."
The "conclusive" presumption proved to be of little assistance to Jackie Carol Jackson, who married Garland Jackson
in Nevada on November 9, 1964. The parties returned to
California to live and on the morning of November 13, less
than four days after the marriage ceremony, Garland discovered that his wife had left him. In his subsequent action
for annulment, she denied that she had not intended to live
with him at the time they were married and also alleged
that she was pregnant with plaintiff's child. An order for
support, prenatal care, hospital expenses, and counsel fees
was entered, and a subsequent order, after the birth of the
child, provided for child support and required compliance
with the previous order with respect to counsel fees. The
court also ordered plaintiff, defendant, and the child to submit
to blood tests. The trial court thereafter refused to admit
2. 245 Cal. App.2d at 359, 53 Cal.
Rptr. at 801.
120
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430 P.2d 289 (1967).
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into evidence the results of the blood tests, which demonstrated that the plaintiff could not have fathered the child,
and denied plaintiff's motion to terminate all prior court orders
for support, doctor and medical expenses. Upon plaintiff's
appeal the Supreme Court reversed, the majority holding
that the ruling of the trial court denied plaintiff a fair opportunity to prove that defendant's child was not conceived
during the short period the couple cohabited. In a four-tothree decision, with Justices Burke, Tobriner and Sullivan
dissenting, the court distinguished the case from its decision
in Kusior v. Silver4 on the ground that the earlier case was
based primarily on the erroneous definition of "cohabiting"
by the trial court. On the other hand, the majority opinion
reiterates the statement in Kusior that the statutory presumption of legitimacy is not so much a conclusive presumption
as a substantive rule of law that a husband will be treated as
the father of a child born to his wife and conceived while
they were cohabiting. Ergo, he must be given the chance
to prove that he is not the legal father by demonstrating the
impossibility that the child was conceived during cohabitation
with his wife. The statute does not refer to "conception
during cohabitation" but conclusively presumes that it occurred; the court has judicially amended the section to permit
proof to the contrary. No matter how the majority may put it,
the end result of the opinion is to add one additional method,
based on blood-test evidence, of avoiding the operation of
the presumption. It is "conclusive" only if the fact which it
conclusively determines to be true is not shown to be impossible, and the manner of proof of impossibility is being constantly broadened. 5
Quasi.Community Property

Brief mention should be made of the decision in the Estate
of Rogers6 upholding the constitutionality of section 13672
4. 54 Cal. 2d 603, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129,
354 P.2d 657 (1960).
5. The conclusive presumption also
does not apply when the husband had
no access to his wife during the time
of conception, Madden v. Madden, 160

Cal. App.2d 422, 325 P.2d 538 (1958);
or is sterile, Hughes v. Hughes, 125
Cal. App.2d 781, 271 P.2d 172 (1954).
6. 245 Cal. App.2d 101, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 572 (1966).
CAL LAW 1967

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

121

9

Community Property and
Family
Law
Cal Law
Trends and
Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 6

of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The section treats, for
inheritance tax purposes, joint-tenancy property having its
source in quasi-community property7 as if one-half of the
consideration for the acquisition of such property were furnished by each spouse, as opposed to section 13671.5, which
provides that if husband and wife place community property
in their joint names, the joint tenancy shall be treated as if
it were community property. The superior court found that
the statute violated not only the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution, but also violated provisions
of the California Constitution. s In reversing, the Court of
Appeal, in a divided opinion, pointed out that quasi-community property has become sui generis; it is not community
property, but neither is it like other separate property, because
it is burdened with both the wife's expectancy in the event
of the husband's death and her contingent rights in the event
of a divorce or decree of separate maintenance. There is,
therefore, reason for permitting a legislative classification, and
the statute is constitutionaV
National Service Life Insurance Policies and the Wissner Rule

In Thoen v. Thoen 1o plaintiff's former husband, following
his remarriage, changed the beneficiary of his National Service
Life Insurance Policyll from plaintiff to his second wife.
The change was made in violation of the provisions of the
divorce decree awarding all of the community property to
plaintiff and enjoining the husband from changing the beneficiary or otherwise altering the terms and conditions of the
policy. The policy was community property of the parties.
Upon death of the husband, defendant, his second wife, received the proceeds of the policy and plaintiff sued to establish
a constructive trust. Plaintiff relied on two cases involving
7. That is, property acquired outside
of the state which would have been
community property if acquired in California. See Cal. Civ. Code § 140.5.
8. Cal. Const. art. I, §§ 11 and 21;
art. IV, §§ 25(10) and 25(33).
9. For analysis critical to the court's
solution of the constitutional issue, see
122
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Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW in this
volume.
10. 248 Cal. App.2d 354, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 614 (1967).
11. An N.S.L.I. policy is a low-cost
life insurance policy made available to
servicemen by the teQeral ~overnJ,I1ent,
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a conflict between local community property laws and federal
laws. Both Free v. Bland12 and Yiatchos v. Yiatchos 13 recognized that the survivorship provisions, allowing beneficiaries
to be designated at will, in the United States Savings Bonds
should not "become a sanctuary for wrongdoers' gains»l4
and that relief should be available where there appears to
have been "fraud or a breach of trust tantamount thereto on
the part of the husband while acting in his capacity as manager of the general community property".15 The Court of
Appeal, in affirming a judgment of dismissal, distinguished
between the strong federal policy announced in the earlier
case of Wissner v. Wissner 16 (upholding the supremacy of the
federal statute in the N.S.L.I. situation) and the regulations
governing savings bonds, and pointed out that this distinction
had been noted in Free v. Bland. The Wissner case controls,
and relief by way of constructive trust is not available.
Annulment
In Whealton v. Whealton 17 the husband, a chief petty officer
on active duty with the United States Navy, instituted an
action for annulment in California against his wife whom
he had married in Maryland and who was still a domiciliary
of and resided in that state. Upon service by publication,
he was awarded a default judgment. The court held the original judgment to be void. The theory of ex parte jurisdiction
in an annulment cannot rely on the concept of a res or status
found within the state, as in the case of divorce actions; however, the courts have recognized a state's interest in providing
a forum for some annulment actions even though the court
12. 369 U.S. 663, 8 L.ed.2d 180, 82
S.Ct. 1089 (1962).
13. 376 u.s. 306, 11 L.ed.2d 724, 84
S.Ct. 742 (1964).
14. 369 u.s. at 671, n. 12, 8 L.ed.2d
at 186, 82 S.Ct. at 1094. Brief for the
United States as amicus curiae at 21.
15. 369 U.S. at 670,8 L.ed.2d at 186,
82 S.Ct. at 1094. Plaintiff does not appear to have cited the California case
of Estate of Bray, 230 Cal. App.2d 136,

40 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1964), applying the
two United States Supreme Court decisions and requiring an accounting as to
one-half of U. S. savings bonds improperly registered in the joint names of the
husband and a third party.
16. 338 U.S. 655, 94 L.ed. 424, 70 S.
Ct. 398 (1950).
17. 67 Cal.2d 667, 63 Cal. Rptr. 291,
432 P.2d 979 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the parties. The
primary issue under the facts in this case was whether due
process concepts of fairness to a defendant permit a plaintiff
to chose a forum inconvenient to the defendant when personal
jurisdiction has not been obtained. Although the domicile
of plaintiff would afford jurisdiction to award an ex parte
annulment, he neither pleaded nor proved domicile in California; the marriage took place elsewhere, the matrimonial
domicile was elsewhere, and defendant lived elsewhere. "The
court was therefore without jurisdiction to enter the default
judgment."18 However, after the entry of judgment, the wife
appeared generally in the action. May the court, on re-trial,
award an annulment when both parties are before it, even
though neither is a domiciliary of the state? Yes. As stated
by the court, ". . . the interests of the state of celebration
of the marriage or the state of domicile of either party do not
preclude a court that has personal jurisdiction over both parties from entertaining an annulment action."19 Must the court
then exercise this jurisdiction in all cases? No.
"In other annulment actions, where personal jurisdiction is the sole jurisdictional basis, . . . the doctrine
of forum non conveniens might well be invoked by one
of the parties or asserted by the court, to cause a discretionary dismissal when fairness and the interests of
judicial administration so demand.,,20
As a result, except for saying that where neither party is a
domiciliary and personal jurisdiction exists as to one only,
the court lacks jurisdiction, the opinion fails to lay down
much in the way of guidelines as to jurisdiction in annulment
proceedings. Apparently domicile of plaintiff will suffice,
and the court may (or may not, in its discretion) entertain the
action if it has personal jurisdiction over both nondomiciliary
parties.
18. 67
295, 432
19. 67
296, 432
124

Cal.2d at 674, 63 Cal. Rptr. at
P.2d at 982.
Cal.2d at 676, 63 Cal. Rptr. at
P.2d at 983.

20. 67 Cal.2d at 676, 63 Cal. Rptr. at
297, 432 P.2d at 984.
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Presumptions and the Evidence Code 1
On January 1, 1967, presumptions ceased to be evidence
in California. 2 Under the new law, presumptions are of two
distinct kinds, and have very different effects. Every presumption is either (1) a presumption affecting the burden of
producing evidence, or (2) a presumption affecting the burden of proof. 3 What will be the status of the various statutory
and non-statutory presumptions which play such an important
part in the field of community property? The Evidence Code
specifies a number of presumptions as belonging in one class
or the other,4 but community property is not mentioned. In
the absence of further legislation, it will be the task of the
courts to apply the criteria set forth in the Evidence Code
and to add unclassified presumptions to the classified list.
Perhaps the most important presumption applied in the
community property cases is the general non-statutory presumption, arising from the statutory definitions of separate
and community property, that property acquired during marriage is community property: The presumption is one of
fact and is rebuttable, but the cases have uniformly held that
it requires a holding that an acquisition is community property in the absence of rebutting evidence. 6 In the presence
of such evidence, the inference from acquisition during marriage is weighed against the rebuttal evidence. The presumption has been referred to as "fundamental to the community
property system."7 Is this now a presumption affecting the
burden of proof, or merely one affecting the burden of producing evidence?
Reference to the Evidence Code gives these guidelines: (1)
a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is
one established to implement no public policy other than to
facilitate the determination of the particular action in which
1. For further analysis see Degnan,
EVIDENCE in this volume.

honey, 71 Cal. App.2d 65, 161 P.2d
944 (1945).

2. Cal. Evid. Code § 600(a).
3. Cal. Evid. Code § 601.
4. See generally, Cal. Evid. Code §§

6. See, e.g., Fountain v. Maxim, 210
Cal. 48, 290 P. 576 (1930); Estate of
Jolly, 196 Cal. 547, 238 P. 353 (1925).
7. Estate of Duncan, 9 Cal.2d 207,
70 P.2d 174 (1937).

630-668.
5. Fidelity &. Casualty Co. v. Ma-
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the presumption is applied;8 (2) a presumption affecting the
burden of proof is one based on implementation of a public
policy.9 In the light of these provisions, it would seem that
the general community property presumption is one affecting
the burden of proof. The status of other community property
presumptions, such as the specific statutory presumption as
to property acquired by a married woman by an instrument in
writing, is less clear.
8. Cal. Evid. Code § 603.

126

9. Cal. Evid. Code § 605.
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